There in Existential Sentences*

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I

This paper will be concerned with what is traditionally referred to as 'Existential sentences'. Existential sentences, as shown in (1) below, have the unstressed, non-deictic *there*.

(1) a. There are two books on the table.
b. There were at least ten people sick.
c. There was a man talking to the child.
d. There was a man shot (by a maniac).
e. There arose revolts among the less educated and less highly trained workers.

Existential *there*-sentences usually contain *be*, whether it is existential / locative *be*, copular *be*, progressive *be*, or passive *be*. They may also contain intransitive verbs which can be characterized as a class of 'verbs of being or coming into being'.

There has been extensive research into existential *there* constructions within the generative-transformational framework. The analyses published so far agree that *there* is a semantically empty element functioning as a dummy subject, although there is disagreement as to the derivation of *there*. In some hypotheses, *there* is transformationally inserted while in others it is generated in the base. Increasing interest in Universal Grammar, moreover, has led us to view the construction from a new perspective. Safir (1982), for example, is an ambitious attempt to examine *there*-sentences in English in relation to impersonal constructions in many other languages. He examines the other empty slot-filler in English, *it*, and offers an analysis which explains the distribution of the two expletives in English. The aim of the present study is to examine some current analyses of *there* constructions and see which analysis can capture the distribution of the expletive *there* most satisfactorily.

II

It is generally claimed that each of the sentences in (1) is somehow related to the sentences in (2) respectively.

(2) a. Two books are on the table.
b. At least ten people were sick.
c. A man was talking to the child.
d. A man was shot (by a maniac).
e. Revolts arose among the less educated and less highly educated workers.

They are synonymous in a theory of truth-conditional semantics. The only difference between them lies in the way the message is coded. We may say that the message is coded in

a marked way in (2) while in (1) it is coded in an unmarked way. Most of the analyses proposed so far have tried to capture the relationship between the sentences in (1) and those in (2) and tried to derive the sentences in (1) from the same sources as the corresponding sentences of (2). However, they differ as to the source of theses sentences. What is the underlying structure from which the pairs of sentences in (1) and (2) derive ?

There are two things that we should consider in determining the underlying structure for *there*-sentences : (1) How is the empty formative *there* derived ? (2) Where in the base is the logical subject NP (i. e. the post-verbal NP) generated ? The analyses proposed in the past make different assumptions about them. In the ensuing discussion, I will compare the analyses of Milsark (1974) and Chomsky (1981) with those of Stowell (1981) and Safir (1982).

In Milsark's analysis and Chomsky's analysis, the *there*-sentences such as in (1) are assumed to be derived from the sentences in (2). They postulate two rules, one of which effects a rightward NP movement around *be* while the other inserts *there* in the empty subject position.

(3) Rightward NP Movement[1]

SD	:	X	NP	Y	be	Z	
		1	2	3	4	5	
SC	:	1	t	3	4	2	5

(4) There-Insertion

SD	:	X	t	Aux	Y
		1	2	3	4
SC	:		2 → there		

According to these analyses, the post-copular NP in *there*-sentences originates as the subject of *be* and it is possible to form existential *there*-sentences corresponding to sentences containing *be* without regard to what kind of *be* is involved. The rules (3) and (4) will allow any sequences of NP-X-*be* to undergo *There*-Insertion.[2] The treatment of *there*-sentences in terms of the two operations described in (3) and (4) has several advantages. It can account not only for the alleged synonymy of sentence pairs like (1) and (2) but also for the restriction of the formative *there* to subject position. The rule (4) assures that *there* is inserted only in the empty subject position of a clause. Moreover, it can account for the intuition that the NP following *be* is the logical subject of the sentence, since the post-copular NP is originated in subject position and then is moved out of that position to non-subject position in surface structure.

Stowell and Safir take a rather different approach. In contrast to *There*-Insertion analysis involving the rightward NP movement, they claim that the copular *be* in *there*-sentences is a raising predicate and that the post-copular material is a 'small clause'. Hence there is no rightward NP movement involved in the derivation of *there*-sentences. According to them, for example, the underlying structure for (1a), repeated here as (5a), is assumed to be (5b), where α is a 'small clause'.

(5) a. There are two books on the table.

b. e are $_{\alpha}$[two books on the table]

If *there* is inserted in the empty subject position in (5b), (5a) is generated ; if not, the subject

NP of the small clause, *two books*, is raised to the matrix empty subject position and the sentence (2a) will be generated. In this account, the formative *there* is directly inserted in the base. The raising analysis can account for the synonymy of the sentences in (1) and (2), for they derive from the same source. Notice, also, that the assumption that the complement of the verb *be* is a small clause can naturally capture the intuition that the post-copular NP is a logical subject. It appears, then, that the analyses presented by Stowell and Safir are equally well-motivated.

Here a question arises. Why is *there* inserted ? In order to answer this question, let us examine the two treatments more closely. Chomsky (1981 : 87) explains the obligatory insertion of *there* into the empty subject position as follows. When the NP subject is postposed and adjoined to VP, a trace is left behind. The trace, as anaphor, must be properly bound and further must be properly governed. However, since the AGR element of INFL cannot be a proper governor for trace, *There*-Insertion rule applies and prevents an ill-formed S-structure from surfacing. The obligatoriness of the insertion of *there*, therefore, is a natural consequence of the Empty Category Principle and the binding principle.

In the analysis involving a small clause, the obligatory insertion of *there* is accounted for differently. Stowell (1978) simply assumes that an empty NP position is spelled out by *there* if it precedes Aux ; otherwise, a sentence containing an unfilled NP at the surface will be ill-formed. Safir, on the other hand, explains the obligatoriness of *there* in a more principled way. Let us consider (5b) again. He assumes that the verb *be*, which is subcategorized for a small clause, does not assign Case and that the postcopular NP *two books* gets its θ-role from *on the table*. In order for (5b) to surface as a grammatical sentence, the lexical NP *two books*, which is in an A-position as the subject of a small clause, must be Casemarked to satisfy the Case Filter. His Case Filter states that a lexical NP in an A-position must have Case at S-structure. Now, Casemarking of the lexical NP *two books* will be achieved if the expletive formative *there* is inserted and the matrix subject position is coindexed with *two books* by free indexing at S-structure.[3] The output of these operations is (6).

(6) there$_i$ are $_{SC}$[two books$_i$ on the table]

Since *two books* forms a θ-chain with a Case-marked subject position that has no θ-role of its own, it can inherit Case from the subject position.[4] This makes it possible for *two books* to pass the Case Filter, as Case Inheritance holds in any θ-chain with a Case-marked position.[5] Thus, the insertion of *there* in Safir's analysis is forced by the Case Filter because the post-verbal NP is not itself in a position that is directly Case-marked.

The accounts of the obligatory insertion of the expletive *there* by Chomsky and Safir seem to be equally successful and satisfactory in that in both accounts the obligatoriness need not be stipulated because it is predicted by other principles in the grammar. However, when we compare the two analyses more closely, we find that there are some problems with Safir's analysis.

Existential *there*-sentences may contain raising predicates as shown in (7).

(7) There seems to be someone in the living room.

According to Safir, the underlying structure for (7) will be something like (8).

(8) e seems $_S$[e to be $_{SC}$[someone in the living room]]

The subject of the small clause, *someone*, gets a θ-role but is not assigned Case, for *be* does not assign Case. In order for the lexical NP *someone*, which is in an A-position, to pass the Case Filter, it needs to be in a θ-chain with a Case-marked position. This will be achieved if the expletive *there* is inserted in the empty subordinate subject position and then is raised to the empty matrix subject position, resulting in the string (9).

(9) there$_i$ seems $_S$[e$_i$ to be $_{SC}$[someone$_i$ in the living room]]

(*Someone, there*) can form a θ-chain ; hence *someone* can inherit Case. As is assumed in the GB theory and also by Safir, the raising predicates like *seem* have the property of deleting the $\overline{S}$ boundary of their complements. Thus *seem* properly governs the subordinate subject and it is a lexical category. (9) is predicted to be well-formed.

Notice, however, that the following ungrammatical sentence (10) contrasts with the grammatical sentence (7).

(10) *There seems someone to be in the living room.

How can we account for the ungrammaticality of such *there*-sentences with raising predicates as (10) ? This is where Safir's analysis falls into difficulty. Consider the string (11).

(11) there$_i$ seems $_S$[someone$_i$ to be $_{SC}$[t$_i$ in the living room]]

Given the analysis presented by Safir, the lexical NP *someone*, which has been moved out of the small caluse into the subordinate subject position, is now in a θ-chain containing a Case-marked position. (*There, someone*) forms a θ-chain and this means that *someone* can inherit Case. Thus, Safir's account predicts that the string (11) is well-formed — a prediction utterly running opposite to the fact. Actually, Safir notices the problem involved in this raising context. He refers to Burzio's (1981) proposal to disallow Case Inheritance across a clause boundary and suggests a possibility of setting up the provision like 'A lexical NP can only inherit Case from a clausemate ...' (265). Given this provision, he argues that (9) is grammatical because *someone* can inherit Case from a clausemate (the empty category in subordinate subject position which in turn inherits Case from *there*), whereas *someone* in (11) does not inherit Case from a clausemate and examples like (11) are thus Case Filter violations. Safir is on the right track in attempting to limit the inheritance of Case to clausemates, so long as the contrast in grammaticality between (7) and (10) is concerned. But, if we turn our attention to other data, we will find that his assumption is not tenable, as the following examples show.

(12) a. There seems to be someone in the living room.

b. There seems to be someone sick.

(13) a. *There seems someone in the living room.

b. *There seems someone sick.

The sentences in (13) are not grammatical in contrast to those in (12). However, if we follow the arguments presented to account for the contrast between (7) and (10), we will not be able to account for the ungrammaticality of the sentences in (13). To see this, look at the strings below.

(14) a. there$_i$ seems $_S$[e$_i$ to be $_{SC}$[someone$_i$ in the living room]]

b. there$_i$ seems $_S$[e$_i$ to be $_{SC}$[someone$_i$ sick]]

(15) a. *there$_i$ seems $_{SC}$[someone$_i$ in the living room]

b. *there$_i$ seems $_{sc}$[someone$_i$ sick][6]

The account for the well-formedness of the strings in (14) has already been given. The problem we have now is why the strings in (15) are ill-formed. The lexical NP *someone* in (15) can surely inherit Case from the Cased matrix subject position because there is no clause boundary between *there* and *someone*. There is no reason to expect the strings in (15) to be ill-formed. Safir is driven into a dilemma. If he adds the provision which limits the Case Inheritance to clausemates in order to account for the ungrammaticality of (10), Safir will make a wrong prediction about (15). Therefore, he will either have to abandon his provision or should present the reason why such sentences as (10) and (13) are ungrammatical. Keeping this inadequacy of Safir's analysis in mind, I will consider some other important facts about *there*-sentences in the following section.

III

As is well-known, English has another expletive formative which functions merely as an empty slot-filler, namely, *it*. Examples are given below.

(16) a. It is raining hard.

b. It is likely that the man is guilty.

c. It seems that John is out.

Like *there*, *it* is semantically empty and nonreferential. *It* appears in the obligatory subject position to which no θ-role is assigned. The weather predicates and the raising predicates do not assign a θ-role to their subjects. *It* and *there* are similar in that they are both nonreferential and that they appear in a non-θ-marked position. However, there are some differences between them. One of the striking differences is that *it* always takes a singular form whereas *there* agrees in number with the postverbal NP.

(17) a. There *is* a book on the table.
There *are* many books on the table.

b. There *seems* to be a visitor in his room.
There *seem* to be several visitors in his room.

It is unarguable that the nonreferential *there* behaves like a syntactic subject NP. It can undergo a number of syntactic transformations such as Subject Raising, Subject-Aux Inversion as in questions, tag-questions, conditionals, etc. Yet, unlike *it*, *there* takes either a singular verb form or a plural verb form according to the number of the logical subject NP. Another difference between the two expletives can be found in their distribution. We should note that in modern English they do not appear in the same environment. Where *it* appears, *there* cannot appear and vice versa. Namely, they are in complementary distribution. (18) shows this.

(18) a. *There* is a book on the table.
**It* is a book on the table.

b. *There* seems to be a visitor in his room.
**It* seems to be a visitor in his room.

c. *It* is raining.
**There* is raining.

d. *It* seems that John is out.

**There* seems that John is out.

Now, the observation given above concerning *there* in relation to *it* leads us to see the existential *there*-sentences from a new perspective. We are led to the question why *there* is inserted in a given context and why *there* cannot be inserted in another context. Can we predict whether *there* or *it* is inserted in a given context ? The attempt to answer this question has not been made in the previous studies of *there*-sentences except in Chomsky and Safir. Chomsky and Safir seem to be the only ones that try not only to account for the obligatoriness of the expletive *there* but also to account why the expletive *there*, not the expletive *it*, has to be chosen in a given context. First, let us consider Safir's accounts on this matter. Languages differ with respect to the distribution of impersonal formatives. Some languages, like English, have plural impersonal formatives whereas others have only one. There are also languages which do not have impersonal formatives at all. Examining impersonal constructions in many languages, Safir states that empty position may optionally be filled by an impersonal formative at S-structure and proposes the following rule as the simplest possible rule to introduce impersonal formatives into the derivation (246).

(19) Impersonal Insertion (Provisional)

Insert an impersonal formative in the position of [e]

In addition to this, he argues that some English-specific distinction between the formatives *there* and *it* must be stated, and he proposes the following condition on Impersonal Insertion to make the appropriate distinction in English.

(20) Insert *there* if [e] is in a θ-chain, otherwise insert *it*.

According to this, the expletive *there* is predicted to be found in the context where the empty position is in a θ-chain whereas *it* is predicted to be found where the empty position is not in a θ-chain. In (18a) and (18b), *there*, not *it*, has to be inserted because *a book* and *a visitor* have to form a θ-chain with a Casemarked position in order for the strings to surface as well-formed sentences. On the other hand, the empty position in (18c) cannot form a θ-chain because it has no θ-role. Therefore, the expletive *it* has to be chosen. In (18d), since *John* has both θ-role and Case, the empty subject position cannot be in a θ-chain and this requires *it*, not *there*, to be inserted. Whether *there* or *it* is inserted, therefore, is quite predictable. The account given by Safir appears plausible. Yet, there is some problem relating to the so-called presentational *there*-sentences like the following.

(21) There walked into the room an old lady.

He assumes that (21) derives from (22) by rightward movement with the subsequent insertion of *there* into the vacated subject position.

(22) An old lady walked into the room.

(23) $e_i\ _{VP}[_{VP}$[walked into the room] an old lady$_i$]

He claims that the expletive *there*, not *it*, *is* inserted because the θ-assigned, non-Casemarked lexical NP *an old lady* forms a θ-chain with [e], which has Case. Notice, however, this argument crucially depends on the assumption that *an old lady* is in an A-position, for his Case Filter states that 'A lexical NP in an A-position must have Case.' A-position is any position that can be a θ-position for some predicate. He introduces the notion 'external θ-position'

stated in (24).

(24) External θ-position

Assign θ-role T to a sister of VP

An old lady in (23), he assumes, is adjoined to VP by Move α and since this VP-adjoined position fits the definition in (24), it counts as an A-position. What seems somewhat problematical in this treatment is that we cannot find convincing arguments for the assumption of the VP-adjoined position as an A-position. In the ususal practices in GB theory, the position created by adjunction is claimed to be an $\overline{\text{A}}$-position and the movement of α from a θ-position to a θ-position is not permitted in the θ-theory. Therefore, if *an old lady* moves from the subject position, which is an external θ-position, to the VP-adjoined position, which is also an external θ-position, the θ-Criterion will be violated. Safir tries to overcome this problem by treating the subject position and VP-adjoined θ-position as a composite θ-position or 'external θ-set', but it appears that further study needs to be done in order to prove the assumption to be valid.

Next, let us turn to Chomsky's argument concerning the distribution of *there* in relation to *it*. In his account, Chomsky takes into consideration the number agreement problem of *there*. (Recall that Safir does not make any reference to the number agreement in *there*-sentences.) As shown in (17) above, the verb in *there*-sentences takes on the number of the post-verbal NP. *There* is an element which must receive number so that the general agreement rule between the subject NP and the verb (i. e. more specifically, between the subject NP and AGR) may apply. Chomsky assumes that the item *there* has the following lexical entry.

(25) [there, [α number]]

There is an NP which is assumed to be unspecified for the syntactic feature 'number' and therefore it has to receive number feature from other element. He claims that *there* receives number via the NP coindexed with the trace it replaces (87). In (26), the empty category is not in a θ-position, so the θ-theory does not block *There*-Insertion.

(26) a. e is raining

b. e held that these truths are self-evident

(from Chomsky : 87)

c. e seems that John is out

The reason why *there* cannot be inserted in the empty positions in (26) is that there is no coindexed NP from which *there* can receive number. It follows, then, that the requirement that *there* must receive number from a coindexed NP determines the possibilities for *There*-Insertion. Chomsky's analysis predicts that the expletive *there* occurs only where it can receive number. In this line of reasoning, Chomsky captures well not only the distributional characteristics of *there* but also the property of number agreement between the matrix verb and the post-verbal NP in *there*-sentences. A question arises, however. It is correctly predicted that *there* cannot be inserted in (26) but *it* should be inserted. But why can't *it* be inserted in (27) ?

(27) a. e is a book on the table

b. e seems to be a visitor in his room

According to his prediction, *there* can be inserted in the empty positions of (27), for it can receive number. Notice, however, that his hypothesis does not say why *it* cannot appear in this context. As we have seen above, *there* and it are in complementary distribution. If so, we need to account for the fact that *there*, but not *it*, must be inserted in the empty position of (27) as well as the fact that *it*, but not *there*, must be inserted in (26).

IV

In this section, I would like to pursue the analysis advanced by Chomsky further and suggest a possibility of accounting for the question raised in the last paragraph.

First, let us consider the lexical properties of the two expletive formatives, *there* and *it*. There is no doubt as to the NP status of *there* and *it*[7]; thus, they must be characterized by a set of grammatical features including person, number, and gender. Following Chomsky, I will assume that *there* does not have number feature. Let us further assume that *there* does not have the other two syntactic features, either. Namely, *there* is simply not specified for the syntactic features. On the other hand, the lexical properties of *it* is straightforward. *It* has all the features, that is, [third person], [singular], and [neuter]. *There* and *it* function as a slot-filler in the same way, but they differ from each other in terms of the specification of grammatical features. Whether *there* or *it* is inserted in a given context is predictable on the basis of this difference, as is proposed in Chomsky. It is in the context where *there* can receive grammatical features that it is assumed to be found. Where it cannot get grammatical features, *there* is not allowed to occur. This way, it is predicted that *there* cannot be inserted in the context of (26) but it can in (27).

Furthermore, I propose to assume that *there* appears in the empty category containing a trace whereas *it* appears in the base-generated empty category. It is generally assumed that, when an NP moves by Move α, it leaves behind a trace and the trace has the relevant grammatical features of the moved NP. Since the lexical item *there* does not have inherent grammatical features, it receives them via the trace that it replaces. All the lexical items must be given grammatical features somewhere in the derivation and in the case of *there*, this is done via trace. In contrast, *it* has all the grammatical features inherently, so it does not have to inherit features from outside. *It* is self-contained and is prevented from appearing in the position containing a trace which has the grammatical features of a moved NP. Given this assumption, it is possible to explain why *there* can appear, but *it* cannot appear, in (27), for there is a trace left behind by the NP movement in either of the strings in (27).

To see how these assumptions work, let us return to our earlier examples and see how they are derived under this treatment. The sentence (1a), repeated here as (28a), derives from the structure underlying (28b).

(28) a. There are two books on the table. (= 1a)
b. Two books are on the table.
c. t^i are two books^i on the table

The subject NP *two books* moves rightward, leaving a trace behind. *There* is inserted in (28c), resulting in (28a). *Two books* inherits Case from the co-superscripted *there* in the subject position. Since *there* takes on the grammatical features of the moved NP, it requires

that the matrix verb *be* be plural. Next, consider the sentences involving raising.

(29) There seems to be someone in the living room. (= 7)

(30) *There seems someone to be in the living room. (= 10)

The grammatical sentence (29) can be derived as in (31).

(31) a. e seems [someone to be in the living room]

b. e seems [t^i to be someone^i in the living room]

c. e seems [there^i to be someone^i in the living room]

d. there^i seems [t^i to be someone^i in the living room]

The post-copular NP *someone* inherits Case from the trace which in turn inherits Case from *there*. The matrix verb agrees with the embedded post-copular NP *someone* because *there*, which has received the features of *someone* through the trace, retains these properties under raising. Thus, the sentence (29) is predicted to be well-formed. In the case of (30), we can attribute its ungrammaticality to the impossibility of inserting *there* in the base-generated matrix empty subject position, for *there* would be without syntactic features. If *it* were inserted instead, the sentence would be also ruled out because of the violation of Case Filter : *someone* will have no Case. It is also to be noted that the sentences in (32a, b) are blocked for the same reason.

(32) a. *There seems someone in the room. (= 15a)

b. *There seems someone sick. (= 15b)

There cannot receive features. If *it* occurred instead, the sentences would be out anyway because of the Case Filter.

The obligatory insertion of *it* and impossibility of the insertion of *there* in the sentences in (33) follows directly from our assumptions.

(33) a. It is raining.
*There is raining. (= 18c)

b. It seems that John is out.
*There seems that John is out. (= 18d)

Since there is no way for *there* to receive person, gender, and number features, *it* is predicted to appear in the matrix subject positions.

V

There are two types of *there*-sentences in English : Existential *there*-sentences and List *there*-sentences. While existential *there*-sentences generally allow only indefinite NPs, list *there*-sentences accept both definites and indefinites. List *there*-sentences, therefore, had been considered exceptional until Rando and Napoli (1978) proposed a unified account of the two constructions. They introduce the concept of anaphoricity / nonanaphoricity and argue, quite convincingly, that only nonanaphoric NPs are permitted in *there*-sentences. I am not in a position to argue for or against them at this stage, but I would like to suggest that list *there*-sentences can be considered as structurally quite different from existential *there*-sentences, for they have the properties that are not characteristic of existential *there*-sentences.

As has been discussed in the preceding sections, one of the remarkable properties of ex-

istential *there*-sentences is the number agreement between the matrix verb and the post-verbal NP. Observe the following list *there*-sentences, however.

(34) a. Well, there's Mary.
b. There's the park, the temple, a new library, and the theater.
c. There was my friend, his wife and the doctor.

As the examples illustrate, list *there*-sentences typically have the verb *be* in singular form (and usually contracted) regardless of the singularity or plurarity of the post-copular NPs. It is not required that *there* in list *there*-sentences receive number feature from the post-copular NP. It appears that *there* in list sentences is more like *it* in this respect.

The similarity of *there* in list *there*-sentences with the expletive *it* is further confirmed when we examine the distribution of *there* in list sentences. The following data are interesting in that they clearly show that *there* and *it* occur in the same environment, namely, they are not in complementary distribution.

(35) a. *There* was John who broke the window.
b. *It* was John who broke the window.

(from Halliday 1967 : 238)

(36) a. I have no one to play with me.
There is Tom (who can play with you).
b. Who is playing with John ?
It is Tom (who is playing with John).

(35b) and (36b) are so-callled cleft-sentences, and the list *there*-sentences (35a) and (36a) look and behave exactly like them. *Who broke the window* in (35a, b) cannot be regarded as a relative clause because a restrictive relative clause cannot generally modify a proper noun. From a functional point of view, list *there*-sentences, like *it*-cleft sentences, do not normally occur discourse-initially.[8] They most naturelly occur as answers to the preceding remarks or questions, as is illustrated in (36a). Furthermore, (36a, b) show that the embedded clause can be deleted both in list *there*-sentences and *it*-cleft sentences, so long as the information deleted is recoverable. What all this suggests is that list *there*-sentences are, presumably, cleft sentences, or a subset of cleft sentences.[9] The suggestion is tentative, not definitive, but if this is correct, we can say that list *there*-sentences are to be distinguished syntactically from existential *there*-sentences. It is beyond the scope of the present paper to make a detailed study and annalysis of cleft sentences, but I simply suggest that list *there*-sentences be treated independently of the existential *there*-sentences and that our assumptions made earlier about the expletive *there* in the existential sentences may not hold for list sentences.

VI

In this paper, I have examined some current anayses of existential *there*-sentences from the following viewpoints : (1) Why is *there* inserted ? (2) How can we predict whether or not *there* is inserted in a given context ? The expletive *there* shares some properties with the expletive *it*, but at the same time it differs from *it* in other respects. Safir and Chomsky offer analyses in which *there* is examined in relation to *it*, and they are most successful in giving answers to the questions (1) and (2). Closer inspection of the two analyses, however, has

shown that Chomsky's analysis is to be preferred over Safir's. To account for the distributional characteristics of *there* in contrast to those of *it*, I have proposed that *there* be restricted to appear in an empty position with a trace. I have touched upon the list *there*-sentences briefly and suggested that they be treated separately from the existential *there*-sentences.

NOTES

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1. Milsark calls the rule (3) 'NP Downgrading' and the rule (4), 'Trace Removal'. I use the more general terms, 'Rightward NP Movement' and '*There*-Insertion' for the sake of convenience. In Chomsky, the operation shown in (3) is effected by Move α.
2. However, it is assumed that existential *there*-sentences are subject to some kind of interpretive rule which will account for the definiteness restriction. For example, see Milsark.
3. Of course, there is another possibility. *Two books* can move to the empty matrix subject position where the subject is assigned NOM Case. Then, if *two books* is coindexed with the θ-position from which it has moved, it will be in a θ-chain. Hence, the structure will be well-formed.
4. 'θ-chain' is the maximal portion of an S-chain containing one and only one θ-position.
   'S-chain' is a sequence of A positions A_1, ... A_n such that for each $i < n$, A_i locally binds A_{i+1}. (Safir 1982 : 50, 53)
5. Case Inheritance (Safir 1982 : 53)
   If NP_a is in a θ-chain containing a Case-marked position, then NP_a has Case.
6. The nature of the category of SC (small clause) is not clear in Safir. From his discussion about the clause-boundness of Case Inheritance and on the basis of the small clause discussions such as in Stowell (1981), I assume that Safir assumes SCs to be projections of their predicates. It is also to be noted that if *someone* in (15) is moved to the matrix subject position, we will have an ungrammatical sentence in (15a).
   (i) *someone$_i$ seems $_{SC}$[e_i in the living room]
   (ii) someone$_i$ seems $_{SC}$[e_i sick]
   I have no idea why (i) is not well-formed. One possibility to rule out (i) is to assume that true raising predicates like *seem* do not take complements other than $\overline{S}$ and AP.
7. It is unarguable that *it* is a pronoun. There is strong evidence to consider *there* as a pronoun, too. For example, *there* behaves like a pronoun in tag questions.
   (i) There is a big difference between John and his brother, isn't *there* ?
   (cf.) *John is a smart boy, isn't *John* ?
   John is a smart boy, isn't *he* ?
8. *It*-cleft constructions are less restricted than *wh*-clefts with respect to the positions in which they occur in discourse. For the few functions that *it*-clefts have, see Prince (1978).
9. Halliday (1967 : 238) regards both (35a) and (35b) as cleft sentences, with *there* and *it* being the cataphoric forms corresponding respectively to the indefinite and definite article.

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